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In the neuropsychological case series approach, tasks are administered that tap different cognitive
domains, and differences within rather than across individuals are the basis for theorising; each indi-
vidual is effectively their own control. This approach is a mainstay of cognitive neuropsychology, and is
particularly suited to the study of populations with heterogeneous deﬁcits. However it has very rarely
been applied to the study of cognitive differences in autism spectrum disorder (ASD). Here, we investi-
gate whether this approach can yield information beyond that given by the typical group study method,
when applied to an ASD population. Twenty-one high-functioning adult ASD participants and 22 IQ, age,
and gender-matched control participants were administered a large battery of neuropsychological tests
that would represent a typical neuropsychological assessment for neurological patients in the United
Kingdom. The data were analysed using both group and single-case study methods. The group analysis
revealed a limited number of deﬁcits, principally on tests with a large executive function component, with
no impairment in more routine abilities such as basic attending, language and perception. Single-case
study analysis proved more fruitful revealing evidence of considerable variation in abilities both between
and within ASD participants. Both sub-normal and supra-normal performance were observed, with the
most deﬁning feature of the ASD group being this variability. We conclude that the use of group-level
analysis alone in the study of cognitive deﬁcits in ASD risks missing cognitive characteristics that may
be vitally important both theoretically and clinically, and even may be misleading because of averaging
artifact.
. Introduction
The acquired cognitive deﬁcits experienced by neurological
atients are heterogeneous, since no two brains are exactly alike,
nd the damage to them will differ from individual to individual,
nd individuals will differ greatly in their pre-morbid characteris-
ics. This fact led to the adoption, principally through the 1980s,
f the neuropsychological single-case design, and became a main-
tay of the ﬁeld of cognitive neuropsychology. The principal aim of
his ﬁeld was to build models of how the normal cognitive system
s organised (as opposed to linking particular domains of cogni-
ion or their disorders to brain structures). This approach has now
een used to extend our understanding of brain–behaviour rela-
ionships in virtually all domains of cognition, including perception,
emory, language, reading and writing, numeracy, and executive
unction, and there are key papers using the single-case study
ethodology in each of these areas that have revolutionized our
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understanding of how the supporting brain systems are organised
(see e.g. Shallice & Evans, 1978 for review). The neuropsychological
single-case method should not be confused with the principally
descriptive case studies that have traditionally appeared in, for
instance, neurology and psychiatry (although these have their own
value). Neuropsychological case study is an empirical procedure
whose starting points are particular deﬁcits or symptoms displayed,
and a model of how the relevant cognitive systems are organised.
The investigation then proceeds through a series of stages that seek
to isolate the precise processing locus underpinning the impair-
ment, excluding as many other possibilities and potential artifacts
as possible. The conclusion of the investigation might be, in the-
oretically oriented work, a challenge to the underlying cognitive
model, or in clinically oriented work, a better understanding of the
causes of the symptom. There are many expositions on, and justiﬁ-
cations of, this now widely accepted method (e.g. Caramazza, 1986;
Caramazza & McCloskey, 1988; Coltheart, 1984; Shallice and Evans,
1978), and the approach has also been applied to the understand-
ing of cognitive deﬁcits in populations other than neurological ones
(e.g. schizophrenia; Shallice et al., 1991).
Another condition where applying a single-case study approach
may prove particularly enlightening is autism spectrum disorder
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ASD). ASD is a neurodevelopmental disorder affecting approxi-
ately 1.0% of the population (Baird et al., 2006) and which presents
ith problems in social interaction, verbal and non-verbal commu-
ication difﬁculties and repetitive and stereotyped disturbances of
ehaviour.
Behavioural and genetic studies ﬁnd that ASD is unlikely to
nvolve just a single primary processing deﬁcit and is more likely to
e associated with a complex pattern of deﬁcits across and within
omains (Happe, Ronald, & Plomin, 2006; Minshew, Goldstein, &
iegel, 1997). In addition, Newschaffer, Fallin, and Lee (2002) report
hat the large variety of neuropathological changes and variability
bserved across patients suggest that ASD is etiologically het-
rogeneous. Consistent with this suggestion, recent neuroimaging
tudies indicate an abnormal pattern of functional specializa-
ion in the brains of participants with ASD (Gilbert, Meuwese,
owgood, Frith, & Burgess, 2009; Pierce, Muller, Ambrose, Allen, &
ourchesne, 2001). If the processes by which distinct brain regions
ecome specialized for speciﬁc functions are disrupted in ASD, this
ay lead to complex and idiosyncratic patterns of strengths and
eaknesses in particular individuals (Gilbert et al., 2009). In this
ase, neuropsychological approaches are required that capture the
ariability in cognitive performance that is likely to accompany such
typical brain organisation and etiological heterogeneity.
Neuropsychological studies investigating ASD have typically
sed group study designs to investigate cognitive impairments.
hese studies have revealed that individuals present with an
neven pattern of cognitive strengths and weaknesses (Frith,
003b). The cognitive deﬁcits may include, but are not limited to,
oor language comprehension, problems with working memory,
ailure to use context to support memory, poor memory for com-
lex visual information, difﬁculties with planning and sequencing,
ifﬁculties with set shifting and a range of difﬁculties with complex
ttention. Strengths have also often been noted on tests of spatial
easoning and abstract problem-solving, on tests of rote memory
nd on tests of focused attention (Frith, 2003b, 2004).
However, there is considerable disagreement between neu-
opsychological studies. For example, Hill (2004) reviews the
vidence on executive function in ASD and ﬁnds mixed results.
hilst ﬁndings regarding some domains of executive function,
uch as inhibition of a pre-potent response, have been found to be
airly consistent, ﬁndings within other components, such as plan-
ing and mental ﬂexibility, have been much more inconsistent (e.g.
ari, Castiello, Marks, Marraffa, & Prior, 2003; Minshew, Goldstein,
uenz, & Payton, 1992; Ozonoff & Jensen, 1999). Similarly, support
or the weak central coherence theory of autism is also equivo-
al (Happé & Frith, 2006). From their review of over 50 studies
appé and Frith concluded that whilst there have been some con-
istent ﬁndings, particularly with tasks such as the block design
nd the embedded ﬁgures tasks, other tasks, such as the Navon ﬁg-
res (Navon, 1977) and various visual illusion tasks have produced
nconsistent and sometimes negative ﬁndings (e.g. Happe, 1996;
ottron, Burack, Stauder, & Robaey, 1999; Plaisted, Swettenham,
Rees, 1999; Ropar & Mitchell, 2001). Finally, a recent review by
illcutt, Sonuga-Barke, Nigg, and Sergeant (2008) also concluded
hat the neuropsychological etiologies of ASD are complex and mul-
ifactorial, with no single deﬁcit sufﬁcient to explain all cases.
Three main explanations can be offered for this observed dispar-
ty. Firstly, perhaps the basis for these inconsistent results is that
he ASD diagnosis incorporates individuals who are highly vari-
ble in terms of their abilities and disabilities, or is composed of
ultiple distinct subgroups. This could in turn lead to signiﬁcantopulation sampling differences across studies. Moreover there is
he strong danger of an “averaging artifact” (Shallice and Evans,
978), where the pattern detected at a group level does not describe
ell any single member of the group. A second possible explana-
ion is that the ASD diagnosis does deﬁne a group of individualsogia 47 (2009) 2981–2988
with a distinct pattern of strengths and deﬁcits, but the deﬁcit is
such that it can cause different results according to prima facie
relatively minor changes in administration or task formats. An
explanation of this kind might for example be that the ASD par-
ticipants do not use social cues in the testing session as well as
controls, or perhaps that they have attentional perturbations that
mean slight task administration differences have major effects on
performance. This detection problem would likely be exacerbated if
no one study administered a full range of tests that might help char-
acterise the nature of this problem. A third possible explanation is
that ASD causes impairments in sensory and other processes (e.g.
language comprehension, perception, short-term attention). These
in turn may then cause unpredictable impairments in tests aimed
at measuring higher level tasks (e.g. problem-solving), depending
on the low-level features of speciﬁc tasks (e.g. stimulus materials).
Since tests of these more lower level processes have typically not
been administered in ASD studies, these deﬁcits are potentially not
detected.
The current study therefore applied both a group and multi-
ple single-case series methodology using a comprehensive battery
of neuropsychological tests to interpret the patterns of cognitive
strengths and weaknesses in ASD. We tested the hypotheses that (i)
observed deﬁcits in higher order cognitive tasks in the ASD group
are independent of deﬁcits on lower level processes such as lan-
guage comprehension, visual perception and short-term attention;
(ii) patterns of deﬁcit will vary from individual to individual within
the ASD group; (iii) that this varying pattern of deﬁcits across indi-
viduals demonstrated by the single-case approach is not revealed
using traditional group study-type analysis; and (iv) the single-case
study analysis will reveal strengths not detected in the traditional
group study analysis. In order to be conservative in our hypothesis
testing, we restricted our study to those ASD individuals performing
in the high-functioning range on standardized intelligence tests;
individual differences are likely to be smaller in a group of this type
compared with a more heterogeneous sample.
2. Methods
2.1. Participant population
Baseline characteristics for the ASD and control participants are presented in
Table 1. Participants were 21 adults (17 males, 4 females) with ASD, all of whom had
a clinical diagnosis of Asperger’s syndrome. Participants were selected if both their
performance and verbal IQ quotients exceeded 85. IQ was measured with the full
11 subtest battery of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-Third Edition (WAIS-III;
Wechsler, 1997).
ASD participants had all previously received a clinical diagnosis of ASD. All ASD
participants were also administered the Autism Diagnostic Observation Scale (ADOS;
Lord et al., 2000). Participants were included in the study regardless of whether or
not they received an Autism/Autism Spectrum diagnosis on the ADOS. In addition,
ASD symptom presentation was measured using the Autism Spectrum Quotient (AQ;
Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin, & Clubley, 2001). Results for the ADOS
and AQ are presented in Table 1.
Twenty-two VIQ, PIQ, FSIQ, age and gender-matched controls were also included
in the study. Independent t-tests (two-tailed) indicated no signiﬁcant difference for
age, gender, VIQ, PIQ and FSIQ. Moreover, p values for each of these variables were
above the 0.50 mark recommended by Mervis and Klein-Tasman (2004) to show
strong overlap between the distributions in each group.
2.2. Measures
A range of valid, reliable neuropsychological tests which are routinely used in
standard United Kingdom clinical neuropsychological practice were selected to tap
a broad range of general cognitive abilities as discussed in the following section.
All tests were administered according to the procedures outlined in the relevant
testing manuals and published papers and a ﬁxed order of testing was used for all
participants.2.2.1. Language
The ability to comprehend language and understand instructions was assessed
using the de Renzi Token Test Shortened Version which employs tokens of three
different colours and three different shapes, presented in a random array. Partici-
pants were administered 15 complex but abstract commands involving these tokens
K.J. Towgood et al. / Neuropsychol
Table 1
Baseline characteristics of the study participants.
ASD participants (n = 21) Control participants (n = 22)
Age (years:months)
Mean 31.76 30.64
Range 19–47 20–43
SD 7.73 6.31
Gender
Males:females 17:4 18:4
IQ
VIQa
Mean 116 117
Range 95–40 90–142
SD 12.49 12.28
PIQb
Mean 112 115
Range 86–150 95–142
SD 14.40 13.14
FSIQc
Mean 116 118
Range 95–149 91–137
SD 13.84 12.51
ADOSd category
None 6 NA
Autism spectrum 6 NA
Autism 9 NA
AQe
Mean 35.86 17.33
Range 17–48 2–42
SD 8.23 8.79
a Verbal Intelligence Quotient.
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c Full Scale Intelligence Quotient.
d Autism Diagnostic Observation Scale (Lord et al., 2000).
e Autism Quotient (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001).
Coughlan & Warrington, 1978). The McKenna Graded Naming Test (McKenna &
arrington, 1980), a 30 item test which assesses the ability to name line drawings
f objects of graded difﬁculty, was also administered.
.2.2. Perception
Object and space perception abilities were assessed with the “Shape Detection”,
Incomplete Letters”, “Object Decision” and “Dot Counting” subtests from the Visual
bject Space Perception Battery (VOSP; Warrington & James, 1991). The “Shape
etection” subtest simply measures participants’ ability to detect an “X” on a card
ith an all over speckled pattern, with half of the cards containing an embedded
nd degraded “X” and half not containing an “X”. On the “Incomplete Letters” subtest
articipants attempt to name a degraded letter of the alphabet. On the “Object Deci-
ion” subtest the participant is presented with 20 cards, each printed with four black
hapes one of which is a silhouette of a real object and three of which are silhouettes
f nonsense objects, and asked to name the real object. Finally on the “Dot Count-
ng” subtest participants simply count the number of dots arranged on separate
ards. Participants also completed the “Minimal Features” and “Overlapping Fig-
res” subtests from the Birmingham Object Recognition Battery (BORB; Humphreys
Riddoch, 1993). In the “Minimal Features” subtest participants were presented
ith three different pictures on each of 25 trials. One was a picture of the target object
aken from the standard viewpoint, one was a picture of the target object taken from
n unusual viewpoint and the third was an object visually similar to the target object.
he task of the participant was to select the two matching objects. In the “Overlap-
ing Figures” subtest speeded identiﬁcation of non-overlapping letters, geometric
hapes and objects were compared to speeded identiﬁcation of overlapping letters,
eometric shapes and objects.
.2.3. Memory
Verbal and visual memory was assessed with the “Story Recall” and “Figure
opy” subtests from the Adult Memory and Information Processing Battery (AMIPB;
oughlan & Hollows, 1985). On the “Story Recall” subtest participants are ﬁrst read
short story of the type you may hear on the television/radio or read in a news-aper and then immediately, and after a delay of approximately 30 min, asked to
reely recall the story. On the “Figure Copy” subtest participants are presented with
complex geometrical ﬁgure to copy and after completing this copy immediately,
nd after a delay of approximately 30 min, asked to freely recall the design. Par-
icipants also completed the full Doors and People battery (Baddeley, Emslie, &
immo-Smith, 1994). The Doors and People battery consists of four subtests andogia 47 (2009) 2981–2988 2983
is designed to assess visual and verbal learning, free recall and recognition. On the
“People Test” participants are ﬁrst required to learn four forename/surname pairs
with the assistance of a coloured photograph and after a short delay are again asked
to recall these names. In the “Doors Test” participants are presented with a set of 12
coloured photographs of doors to learn and then later presented with a forced choice
recognition task. On the “Shapes Test” participants learn four geometrical designs
by ﬁrst copying them, and then are asked to recall these shapes immediately, and
again after a short delay. Finally, on the “Names Test” participants are presented with
12 forename/surname pairs to learn and then later presented with a forced choice
recognition task.
2.2.4. Executive function
Executive function was assessed with the “Zoo Map” and “Six Elements” sub-
tests from the Behavioural Assessment of Dysexecutive Syndrome (BADS; Wilson,
Alderman, Burgess, Emslie, & Evans, 1996), the Hayling and Brixton (Burgess &
Shallice, 1997), the “Proverbs” subtest from the Delis Kaplan Executive Function
Scale (DKEFS; Delis, Kaplan, & Kramer, 2001), the Cognitive Estimation Test (CET;
Shallice & Evans, 1978), the Modiﬁed Card Sorting Test (MCST; Nelson, 1976), Con-
trolled Oral Word Fluency (COWA; Benton, 1968), Trail Making Test (Reitan, 1958),
and the “Information Processing Speed Parts A and B” subtests from the AMIPB
(Coughlan and Hollows, 1985).
From the BADS, the “Zoo Map” subtest assesses planning by asking participants
to show how they would visit a series of designated locations on a copy of a map,
whilst also following a number of speciﬁed rules. On the “Six Elements” subtest par-
ticipants are required to plan and organise their time to complete at least some of
each of six separate sub-tasks, whilst following predeﬁned rules. The “Proverbs” sub-
test from the D-KEFS measures mental ﬂexibility and the ability to think abstractly
and consists of eight sayings each of which the participant must give a meaning
for, ﬁrst in a free inquiry format and second by selecting from four multiple choice
options. The CET measures the ability to generate effective problem-solving strate-
gies and participants are asked to estimate answers to 10 questions such as “what is
the length of the average man’s spine” and “how tall is the average English woman”.
The MCST measures set shifting and response inhibition and requires participants
to sort cards on one of three possible dimensions (colour, number, shape) according
to an unspoken rule. After correctly sorting six cards, the participant must shift to
sort the cards along another dimension and so forth until the completion of the test.
The COWA measures verbal ﬂuency and requires participants to verbally generate
as many words as possible beginning with three letters of the alphabet, being in the
case of the current study F, A and S. Participants are given a 60 s time limit for each
letter and must obey certain rules. The “Trail Making Test” is a test of processing
speed and set shifting and requires participants to draw lines connecting a series of
25 circles. In Part A participants must connect the numbers 1–25 placed randomly
over an A4 page and in Part B participants connect the letters A-L and the numbers
1–13 in alternative order. The task is scored in terms of time to complete the items.
Finally, on the “Information Processing” subtests participants are required to work
through a list of items. For Part A each item comprises an array of ﬁve two digit
numbers and the participants’ task is to cancel out the second highest number. On
Part B each item contains a four digit array, a hyphen, and then a ﬁve digit array. The
participants’ task is to cross out the number in the ﬁve digit array not contained in
the four digit array. Participants are given 4 min for each task. The task is scored in
terms of number of items crossed out within the time limit. A test of simple motor
speed, where the participant simply has to cross out the digit ‘1’ from a page of ‘1s’
is also administered.
3. Results
3.1. Group difference analysis
Normality and heterogeneity were checked in the ASD and
control groups using the Shapiro–Wilks test and Levene’s test
respectively. Depending on the results, group analysis was then
conducted with either independent t-tests or Mann–Whitney tests,
as appropriate. Group analysis was conducted with 77 measures
derived from 17 distinct neuropsychological tests/test batteries.
Where a test yields more than one sub-measure (e.g. Six Element
Test yields three measures: number of tasks attempted, longest
time spent on any one sub-task, and number of rule-breaks) we
considered all of these sub-measures (using raw rather than scaled
scores). We also considered measurements that were derived math-
ematically from others (e.g. Trail Making Test Part B time taken
minus Part A time taken). However we did not include any mea-
sures that were sums or de facto averages of combinations of the
sub-measures already considered (e.g. WAIS-III VIQ). As can be seen
from Table 2 group analysis revealed limited impairment in the
ASD group across the full range of tests, with only one test measure
2984 K.J. Towgood et al. / Neuropsychol
Table 2
Mean and SD for ASD and control participants on those measures that showed a
decrement according to a group-level analysis.
Test ASD participants
(n = 21)
Control participants
(n = 22)
Sig.
Trail Making Test
A Time 30.23 (10.29) 24.06 (7.33) .039
AMIPB info processinga
Info A motor speed 50.33 (8.22) 56.36 (8.37) .022
Info B motor speed 51.86 (7.58) 59.68 (9.30) .004
Hayling
Raw 1 Time 13.10 (7.95) 7.91 (8.04) .040
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ASD group and controls was highly signiﬁcant (median ASD = 8.0;
median controls = 3.0; U = 83.5, p = 0.0004). When the above anal-
ysis was replicated using the ASD group’s performance as the
normative standard no signiﬁcant group differences were detected.
Table 3
Neuropsychological test measures revealing variable performance in the ASD groupa.
Measure Range (z-scores) % >2SDsb % <2SDs
AMIPB Information Processingc
A adjusted for speed 12.4 28.6 9.5
A total 11.3 28.6 9.5
B adjusted for speed 9.6 14.3 14.3
B total 8.7 14.3 14.3
Trail Making Test
B time 9.8 19.0 28.6
B–A time 8.9 19.0 28.6
BORBd
Drawings/drawings overlap ratio 7.0 5.0 10.0
WAIS-IIIe
Arithmetic 6.7 28.6 19.0
Picture arrangement 6.2 9.5 14.3
a Variable performance is deﬁned as range exceeded six standard deviations of the
control performance, and there were examples of ASD performance at both <2SDs
and >2SDs from the control mean.Doors 19.24 (3.71) 21.23 (2.54) .030
Visual 20.62 (4.38) 23.05 (3.47) .039
a Adult Memory and Information Processing Battery (Coughlan et al., 1985).
howing signiﬁcant group differences at the .01 level and a fur-
her ﬁve showing signiﬁcant difference at the .05 level. Observed
eﬁcits were not related to order of test administration, with the
oors and People administered at the beginning of the assessment
ession, the AMIPB and the Trail Making Tests administered in the
iddle and the Hayling towards the end of the assessment session.
he remaining battery of tests revealed no signiﬁcant differences
etween the ASD and control groups. Importantly, group analysis
evealed no signiﬁcant difference on the lower level tests of abil-
ty such as language comprehension, perception and short-term
ttention.
It is important to note that none of the signiﬁcant group ﬁnd-
ngs discussed above survived a Bonferroni correction at an alpha
evel of .05. This is not surprising in a population with marked
eterogeneity of ability, consisting of both impairment and supra-
ormal performance. A group-level analysis would be less likely to
eveal patterns of performance at the individual level that might be
nstructive, especially with a large battery of tests.
.2. Single-case study analysis
For the multiple case series analysis, not only was each indi-
idual’s performance compared with a normative sample, but also
he relative levels of performance across tasks within the individ-
al were considered. In order to conduct this analysis test scores for
he 77 measures discussed above were converted to z-scores, based
n the performance of the matched control group. The maximum
ange of performance on each of the 77 measures in the control
roup was 4.8. In the ASD group 24/77 measures (31%) showed a
ange exceeding this criterion set by the maximum range of the
ontrol group. As this ﬁgure is unchanged when the 6 participants
ho did not meet ADOS criteria are removed from the analysis we
ave included these participants in the remainder of the analy-
is in order to improve statistical power. These data quite clearly
how that a deﬁning feature of the ASD group examined here was
onsiderable variation in performance. This variability was noted
cross all neuropsychological measures in our battery, including
he individual WAIS-III IQ sub-measures. When summed together
o produce VIQ, PIQ and FSIQ less variability was observed, although
ue to the underlying sub-measure variability caution needs to
e applied when interpreting these summed IQ index scores. Of
ourse, increased variance will usually be expected in a patholog-
cal group (relative to controls who are not expected to show the
mpairment), since an increased number will likely perform very
oorly, but some will not show the characteristic under study. How-
ver the variance reported here appeared to go beyond this pattern.
ome people within the ASD group were supra-normal at some
ests, whilst others in the group were impaired. In other words, theogia 47 (2009) 2981–2988
increased variance for a number of measures did not derive from
just impaired performance. Table 3 details those tests that showed
the largest variation, and where individuals within the ASD group
performed at both an impaired (<2SDs poorer than controls) and a
“supra-normal” level (>2SDs above control group mean).
Nor was it especially the case that there were some people
in the ASD group who were highly gifted across all tasks, and
some individuals who were weak at all tasks. Many individu-
als showed evidence of both supra-normal performance on some
tests, and impaired performance on others. There were no mea-
sures where only superior performance (>2SDs of controls) was
detected in the ASD group. However there were some measures
where only impaired performance was detected. For instance, six
of the ASD group performed below the 1st percentile of the con-
trols on the AMIPB Figure Recall test (immediate and delayed
recall components), compared with only one control. This differ-
ence is signiﬁcant at p = 0.046 (Fisher’s Exact Test, two-tailed). None
of the other measures, when submitted to such tabular analysis,
reached signiﬁcance individually. There are however several mea-
sures where the proportion of ASD participants who produced a
noteworthy performance was greater than twice that of the control
group. Thus the appropriate statistic should take the totality of this
evidence into account.
To do so fully would be beyond our current knowledge of the
inter-relationships and inter-dependencies between neuropsycho-
logical sub-measures. However given the size of the effects, a
simplistic approach will probably sufﬁce. Accordingly, we tallied,
for each participant, the number of tasks where their performance
was at least two standard deviations above or below the control
mean (see Table 4). Comparison of the number of sub-measures
that each individual performed at or below two standard devia-
tions below the control mean showed a signiﬁcant group difference,
with the median of the ASD group (5.0) more than twice that of the
controls (2.0; Mann–Whitney U = 134.0, p = 0.018). Furthermore, if
one deﬁnes any performance either above or below two standard
deviations of the control mean as unusual for each measure, the
difference between the number of “unusual observations” for theb Percentage of the ASD group who performed at this level.
c Adult Memory and Information Processing Battery (Coughlan and Hollows,
1985).
d Birmingham Object Recognition Battery (Humphreys and Riddoch, 1993).
e Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale—third edition (Wechsler, 1997).
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his indicates that the present results cannot simply be a statistical
rtifact of comparing the performance of two groups with norms
eﬁned by the performance of just one of the groups.
Interestingly, this tendency towards atypicality of performance
ppeared to be a characteristic independent from one the most
ften-quoted neuropsychological features of an ASD group: motor
peed. The biserial correlations between group membership (i.e.
SD or control) and performance on the neuropsychological
easures showed that the strongest single predictor of group mem-
ership was the motor speed sub-measure of section B of the AMIPB
nformation Processing test (r = −.43, p = 0.004). However, regres-
ion analysis predicting group membership showed that motor
peed accounted for a separate proportion of variance in group
embership from that of the total number of atypical (or unusual)
erformance but that total unusual performances accounted for
larger amount of variance when these variables were consid-
red alongside each other (Motor Speed B, t = −2.86, p = .007; total
nusual performance t = −3.55, p < .001). Both variables together
ccounted for a remarkable 34.6% of the variance (adjusted) in
roup membership (F = 12.12, p < .000). Thus the prevalence of
nusual or atypical performance in the ASD group cannot be
ttributed to some general effect of motor speed differences across
he neuropsychological tests.
.3. Relationship between cognition, ADOS and AQ
As can be seen from Table 1, six participants did not meet
DOS criteria. We therefore removed them from the sample and
e-analysed these data. There was a limited relationship between
erformance on the cognitive variables and the signs and symptoms
f autistic spectrum disorders. Those who showed more features of
he communication problems symptomatic of ASD as measured by
he ADOS tended to perform more poorly on the Doors sub-measure
f the Doors and People memory test (−.552, p = .009). But per-
ormance on the BORB Shape Triplets subtest actually appeared to
e better in those who showed these communication signs (0.567,
= .009). Similarly, those who showed problems on the imagina-
ion sub-scale of the ADOS performed poorly on the Proverbs test
Proverbs free inquiry r = −.552, p = 0.018; multiple choice −.50,
= 0.033), and on one sub-measure of the Zoo Map test (Sequencing
wo r = −.525, p = .025). However they performed somewhat bet-
er on the AMIPB Information Processing test (A adjusted: r = 0.510,
= .031). Interestingly, overall individual variability in test scores
cross the full battery was also strongly predictive of symptoms
s measured by the ADOS. Those who showed more problems on
he communication sub-scale tended to show greater variability in
est scores (r = .679, p < 0.001), and similarly those showing greater
roblems on the social sub-scale also tended to show greater vari-
bility in test scores (r = .549, p = 0.010).
There was only one neuropsychological test that showed a rela-
ionship with AQ score. This was the AMIPB Story Free Recall
able 4
vidence of extreme range of performance in the ASD participants revealed by
ingle-case analysisa.
N Median Mean SD Range pb
ontrols: measures supra-normal 22 0.5 0.8 1.0 0–3 .134
SD: measures supra-normal 21 1.0 2.2 3.0 0–10
ontrols: measures impaired 22 2.0 3.2 2.8 0–9 .018
SD: measures impaired 21 5.0 6.8 6.1 0–24
ontrols: total measures impaired 22 3.0 4.0 3.2 0–11 .0004
SD: total measures impaired 21 8.0 9.0 5.6 2–25
a Shown is the number of measures from the neuropsychological battery (out of
total of 77 measures) where performance were either 2SDs below the mean of
he controls (“impaired”); more than 2SDs above it (“supra-normal”); or both values
ummed (“unusual”), with the appropriate group comparison.
b Mann–Whitney, adjusted for ties.ogia 47 (2009) 2981–2988 2985
(Immediate Recall r = −.593, delayed −.588, both p = .005). Vari-
ability in test scores was also not related to performance on the
AQ.
4. Discussion
We compared participants with ASD to age and IQ matched con-
trols on a large battery of neuropsychological tests, using both group
and single-case level analysis. The group-level analysis revealed a
limited set of deﬁcits on measures of processing/motor speed, a
measure of executive function tapping response initiation, inhi-
bition and set shifting and visual memory. These deﬁcits are
consistent with ﬁndings from other recent studies with adults
(Ambery, Russell, Perry, Morris, & Murphy, 2006; Blair, Frith, Smith,
Abell, & Cipolotti, 2002; Hill & Bird, 2006; Lopez, Lincoln, Ozonoff,
& Lai, 2005; Minshew et al., 1992; Ozonoff et al., 2004; Williams,
Goldstein, & Minshew, 2005). For example, Hill and Bird (2006)
similarly reported deﬁcits on the same measure of executive func-
tion tapping response initiation, inhibition and set shifting and on a
measure of processing speed in their group of 22 high-functioning
autism participants. However, unlike others (Hill and Bird, 2006;
Lopez et al., 2005; Ozonoff et al., 2004) we did not ﬁnd deﬁcits
on other measures of executive function which tap elements of
planning. Our ﬁnding of impaired processing/motor speed is also
consistent with their ﬁnding of generally slowed psychomotor
speed in this group of participants. Similarly, our ﬁnding of impair-
ment on tests of visual memory, but not on verbal memory, is
consistent with a recent ﬁnding by Ambery et al. (2006).
No impairments were detected on the lower level tests of abil-
ities such as short-term attention, language comprehension and
perception. This supports the ﬁrst hypothesis, discussed in Section
1, in other words, that impairments in higher level abilities are not
based on more primary difﬁculties.
In support of our second hypothesis, that patterns of deﬁcit
would vary from individual to individual within the ASD group,
the analysis revealed evidence of considerable variation in abil-
ities both between ASD participants, and also within individual
participants. Both sub-normal and supra-normal performance was
observed within the pattern of performance for our ASD partic-
ipants. In fact, the most deﬁning feature of the ASD group was
this variability, rather than sub-normal or supra-normal perfor-
mance on any one particular variable or group of variables. This
pattern of marked variability was not apparent from the group-level
analysis, in support of our third hypothesis. Regression analysis con-
ﬁrmed that this atypical performance in the ASD group could not be
attributed to some general effect, such as motor speed differences
across the neuropsychological tests. Finally, in keeping with our
fourth hypothesis, the single-case study approach also revealed evi-
dence of individual supra-normal performance, or strengths, that
again were not apparent when the data was only analysed at the
group level.
4.1. Relationships between neuropsychological tests and
diagnostic symptoms
It is also worth commenting on the ﬁndings related to autism
diagnosis. The ADOS and AQ measures were included to help cat-
egorise the Autism population and not as planned independent
variables. As such no speciﬁc hypothesis were formulated with
regard to expected ﬁndings. However, it is interesting to note that
very little relationship was observed between the ADOS, the AQ
and performance on the separate neuropsychological tests. Whilst
failure to ﬁnd signiﬁcant results may in part be due to the high
variability within the data, this ﬁnding does support existing stud-
ies which have failed to ﬁnd a link between Autism symptoms
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nd neuropsychological task performance (e.g. Ozonoff et al., 2004;
ellicano, Maybery, Durkin, & Maley, 2006). We did however ﬁnd a
igniﬁcant relationship between the amount of individual variabil-
ty on tests, and the Social and Communication sub-scales from the
DOS. This raises the possibility, which would need to be conﬁrmed
ith larger group numbers, that this neuropsychological variability
n itself is in part characteristic of ASD and perhaps could in future
erve as an important endophenotype.
.2. Heterogeneity as a deﬁning feature of high-functioning ASD,
nd its explanations
The observation revealed by the multiple case series analy-
is, showed a markedly heterogeneous pattern of performance
cross participants, and with differing strengths and weaknesses
ithin individuals, poses problems for single core cognitive deﬁcit
ccounts of ASD. A number of other authors (Happe et al., 2006;
illcutt et al., 2008) have similarly recently made the call for a shift
way from single core deﬁcit and simple linear models of pathways
rom underlying cause to symptom presentation. But what are the
lternatives?
A possible alternative has previously been put forward by
inshew et al. (1997). Based on their analysis of a group of 33 ASD
articipants Minshew et al. (1997) hypothesized that a disorder
f complex information processing leads to the multiple primary
eﬁcit syndrome that is seen in ASD. Whilst Minshew et al. do report
uperior performance in the results of their ASD participants, the
odel described in the paper is still limited by the fact that it is
deﬁcit model, albeit a multiple primary deﬁcit model. As such,
he model of Minshew et al. does not ﬁt well with the evidence
f supra-normal performance from our study. In addition, our evi-
ence of strong performance in some ASD participants on tasks of
omplex information processing is also contrary to the hypothesis
hat a disorder of complex information processing underlies ASD.
An alternative explanation for the ﬁndings in our study is the
ntra-individual variability hypothesis recently explored by Geurts
t al. (2008) in their study of reaction time in ADHD, ASD and
ourette’s syndrome. Geurts et al. (2008) proposed that the pat-
ern of variability observed across and within participants may
e explained by frequent lapses of attention or arousal. It is pos-
ible that these lapses could also result in a pattern of variable
erformance across tasks in a full cognitive battery, although such
n explanation seems better suited to explaining patterns of sub-
ormal performance than to explaining patterns of supra-normal
erformance or combinations of sub-normal and supra-normal per-
ormance, as observed in our study. Further, an explanation based
n variability of arousal and/or attention would predict that in
ddition to seeing ﬂuctuation within and across tasks in a single
esting session that we should also see ﬂuctuations across time and
esting sessions. Perhaps it could be speculated that deﬁcits may
ppear when arousal levels are sub-optimal and strengths when
rousal levels are optimal. But evidence of good test neurocogni-
ive stability across time in Asperger’s syndrome appears to rule
ut such an explanation (Nyden, Billstedt, Hjelmquist, & Gillberg,
001), although the evidence in this respect is rather limited.
How else might simultaneous supra-performance in some
omains and impairments in others be explained? One way might
e if at critical developmental stages there is an alteration of the
sual functional specialization of certain brain regions. Direct evi-
ence for this hypothesis is now emerging. For example, at the
hysiological level, researchers have suggested that reduced synap-
ic pruning early in the life of an individual with ASD (Frith, 2003a)
ay in turn lead to an overabundance of neural pathways and
ncourage the formation of relatively separate populations special-
zed for different tasks. For example Pierce et al. (2001) reported
hat their ASD participants showed unique functional neural mapsogia 47 (2009) 2981–2988
when processing faces, potentially as the result of aberrant devel-
opmental experience. They suggested that compared with control
participants, ASD participants ‘see’ faces by utilising neural systems
that are unique for each individual.
In addition, two fMRI studies by Gilbert et al. (Gilbert, Bird,
Brindley, Frith, & Burgess, 2008; Gilbert et al., 2009) demonstrated
unusual functional specialization within medial prefrontal cor-
tex in ASD. Gilbert et al. (2008) demonstrated a difference in the
average peak co-ordinate of activation between ASD and control
groups. Moreover, Gilbert et al. (2009) showed that evidence for
abnormal functional organisation within medial prefrontal cor-
tex is more readily apparent when results are analysed on a
participant-by-participant basis, rather than at the group level. In
their study, the authors demonstrated that ﬁne-grained special-
ization within medial prefrontal cortex, at the level of individual
voxels, differed between participants with ASD and an age- and
IQ-matched control group. In order to obtain this type of evi-
dence, a single-case approach was necessary. They suggested that
an abnormal process by which distinct brain regions become spe-
cialized for particular functions may lead to idiosyncratic changes
in the abilities of different individuals. The present study pro-
vides behavioural data directly in line with this account. Future
studies would beneﬁt from combining the case study methodol-
ogy with neuroimaging data, to provide further evidence on the
relationship between changes in functional brain specialization
and observations of neuropsychological heterogeneity. Approaches
that seek to understand this heterogeneity offer great potential to
improve our understanding of the complex pattern of brain re-
organisation in ASD, which may in turn improve our understanding
of the underlying causes of symptom presentation (Gilbert et al.,
2009).
4.3. Explanations for the inconsistency of results across different
studies: insights from the multiple case study approach
The limited sample sizes in this study do not allow a
deﬁnitive characterization of the neuropsychological deﬁcits in
high-functioning ASD, nor even that seen within this particular set
of tests. This was not the purpose of the study. But the results from
the analysis at the single-case level do allow for some consideration
of the plausibility of the three explanations for the inconsistency of
the neuropsychological ﬁndings across different studies in the ﬁeld
of ASD research that were outlined in Section 1.
The ﬁrst of these possibilities was that the ASD diagnosis
might encompass individuals who are highly variable in terms of
their abilities and disabilities, or composed of multiple distinct
subgroups, which could lead to signiﬁcant population sampling
differences across studies. The data here is consistent with the for-
mer proposition; conﬁrmation of the latter would require a far
larger sample. But the danger of an “averaging artifact” (Shallice
and Evans, 1978), where the pattern detected at a group level
does not describe well any single member of the group, was
highlighted well by the contrast between the striking ﬁndings at
the single-case level and those much weaker ones at the group
level.
The second potential explanation for the inconsistency between
the ﬁndings of different studies was that the ASD diagnosis might
deﬁne a group of individuals with a distinct pattern of strengths
and deﬁcits, but the deﬁcit is such that it can cause different results
according to prima facie relatively minor changes in administra-
tion or task formats. This possibility is lent support, prima facie, by
the variability of performance at the single-case level. However it
is challenged by the totality of the evidence: unusual performances
(i.e. either supra- or sub-normal) were only seen on a limited range
of the tests administered here. These ones were overwhelmingly
those that had a large executive control component (including
sychol
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emory and perception tests with this characteristic). This seems
promising avenue for further enquiry.
The third possible explanation for inconsistency across studies is
hat ASD causes impairments in sensory and other processes which
ay then cause unpredictable impairments in tests aimed at mea-
uring higher level tasks (e.g. problem-solving), depending on the
ow-level features of speciﬁc tasks (e.g. stimulus materials). This
xplanation was not supported at all by the present data: the ASD
roup were just as capable as the control group on tests of rou-
ine cognitive skills (e.g. reading, comprehension, etc.), and were
atched for IQ.
.4. Advantages of the multiple case study design for theoretical
evelopment
As Willcutt et al. (2008) note, in addition to explaining the het-
rogeneity across the spectrum of disorders such as ASD, it is also
mportant that current models account for the signiﬁcant neu-
opsychological heterogeneity at the level of the individual. The
vidence from the present study challenges an explanation in terms
f a single deﬁcit or change in processing “style” underlying ASD.
owever the ﬁnding that the perturbations in cognition at the
ingle-case level were almost conﬁned to those tasks with a large
xecutive component suggest a limit to the possibilities that might
rst be investigated. Further, they suggest that, at least in high-
unctioning ASD, one might ﬁrst seek an explanation in terms of
ariable and abnormal development of a brain system (e.g. a multi-
omponential executive system), rather than a single process, or a
isparate and random range of them. An investigation of that theo-
etical possibility is likely to require a more sophisticated approach
han only reporting mean differences between groups, and it is difﬁ-
ult to see how this conclusion could have been reached from these
ata had we only done so.
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